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The Testator's Intent-Vague Meanings Of
Clear Sounding Phrases
LONDO H. BRowN*
One of the greatest dangers that a lawyer faces is the danger that
he may not recognize that there is a real problem involved when
a client calls upon him for advice. Once the lawyer sees that
there is a problem and is able to correctly diagnose the problem,
the solution of the problem is usually relatively easy. In other
words, there is more danger that the lawyer will overlook the
problem than that he will fail to find the proper solution after he
has found the problem. Furthermore, he may create a problem in
drafting legal instruments if he does not know that a particular
problem exists in the area of law involved.
As an example, a client may inform his lawyer that he-the
client-is the executor of a will which devised and bequeathed
the residue of the testator's estate to the children of the testator's
son, John. The client may inform the lawyer that John survived
the testator, but is now dead, having had five children, all of whom
survived him. The client-executor asks the lawyer how the estate
should be divided. If the lawyer does not see that there is a problem
concerning class gifts involved, he may think, as most laymen do,
that a gift in a will to the children of John means a gift to the
children of John. As a lawyer familiar with class gifts knows,
this may or may not be true. It would mean a gift to John's children
if all of them were alive at the testators death, but if some of the
children were born after the testator's death they would be excluded
and would not share in the gift' unless all the childdren were
born after the testator died, in which case all the children would
share.'
Does a gift in a will to the descendants or issue of the testator
mean a gift to the descendants or issue of the testator who survive
him? The answer to this question is that a gift of this type is
generally not a gift to all such descendants or issue.
*Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
I Dawson v. Christopher, 122 W. Va. 543, 11 S.E.2d 175 (1940).
2 5 A~mucAN LAW OF Psopmarry § 22.42 (Career ed. 1952).
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There are many other problems of construction which arise when
apparently innocent words are used in a manner to suggest that
there is really no problem involved. A devise of real property
is made in a will to John, but if he die without issue, to Richard.
Does this mean that Richard gets the property if John survives
the testator and then dies without surviving issue? This is certainly
not the case in all jurisdictions. Would it make any difference if
John had had issue, all of whom predeceased John?
Suppose that a testator devises property to his widow for life,
remainder to John and Mary, or the survivor of them. Does this
mean that if Mary should survive John she then owns the entire
property? The answer is that it may or may not mean that, depend-
ing upon other circumstances.
It is the purpose of this article to point out several construction
problems which, on the surface, may not seem to be problems at all,
to attempt to show what the problem is in each situation, and
then delve into the possible solutions. Authority for the suggested
solutions may not appear immediately therewith, but, in such cases,
will appear in the discussions following thereafter.
I. Gn-7s TO Hms, IssuE on DEScENDANTS
Gifts to heirs have often been made in wills. Since the gifts
are often composed of personal property as well as real property
the courts have had to determine whether the testator meant those
persons who would take real estate by descent, or those who would
take personal property so far as personal property to be disposed
of by the will was concerned. Real property descends to heirs
and personal property is distributed to next of kin in most juris-
dictions. While this has made some difference in the past, most
statutes of descent and distribution today provide that real and
personal property go to the same persons.
West Virginia Code § 42-1-1 (Michie 1966) provides that real
property shall descend first to children and their descendants, but
if there be no children or descendants of any children, to the wife
or husband. If there be none of these, then the real estate descends
to other specified relatives.
[Vol. 69
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The West Virginia statute pertaining to the distribution of per-
sonal property' provides that personal property shall be distributed
to and among the same persons as real estate is directed to
descend, except that if the intestate left a surviving spouse, such
spouse takes one-third, with surviving issue, if any, taking the other
two-thirds. If there is no surviving issue, the surviving spouse
takes all the personal property.
Thus, it is only where there is a surviving spouse and surviving
issue that there is any difference between those who take real and
personal property in West Virginia. The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia has tended to treat gifts to heirs in wills as
including gifts to next of kin if personal property has been
involved.4 However, if a testator should devise and bequeath
the residue of his estate, real and personal, to his heirs at law
and should leave surviving descendants, and a widow who did
not wish to renounce the will and take her statutory share, the
court may have to decide the point. As a matter of fact, the lawyer
would like to have the point decided in order to advise the widow
in regard to whether she should renounce the will. The descendants
would be the heirs at law, while the widow and the descendants
would be the next of kin. Whether the widow would receive
under the will a share of the real property and a one-third share
of the personal property making up the residue of the estate would
be a material point to consider. The Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has determined that, where there is a gift of blended
real and personal property to heirs at law, the persons answering
that description take, although the court indicated that if the gift
to the heirs at law was all personal property the term would be
construed as distributees'
The words "issue" and "descendants" are treated by most courts
as being almost synonomous. The West Virginia court has stated
that "the word 'descendant' in its technical sense comprises issue
of every degree" and that the word "descendant" is "similar in
meaning to the word 'issue'". 6 For that reason these words will
not be dealt with separately herein.
3 W. VA. CODE § 42-2-1 (Michie 1966).
4 See, e.g., Lively v. Griffith, 84 W. Va. 393, 99 S.E. 512 (1919).5 Allison v. Allison's Exrs, 101 Va. 537, 44 S.E. 904 (1903).
6 Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va. 703, 712, 37
S.E.2d 563, 568 (1946).
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Where there is a gift in a will to the issue or descendants of the
testator or some other person, and there are more than one
generation of descendants who would qualify if that word were
given its full meaning, are all such descendants entitled to share?
In other words, do such descendants take per capita or per stirpes?
Suppose that the gift is to testator's descendants and he is survived
by two children, each of whom have two children. It cannot be
said that the testator did not leave six descendants. Should the
estate be divided into six shares and a share be given to each of
the six descendants, or into two shares which are given to his two
children? Futher, suppose that a third child of the testator's had
predeceased him, leaving six children. Should the estate then be
divided into twelve shares and one share given to each of testator's
twelve descendants?
There is a split of authority on this point, some courts holding
that all descendants take per capita and other courts holding that
there shall be a per stirpes distribution."
Since the word "descendants" is equivalent to "issue" and "issue'
is equivalent to "heirs of the body", it is submitted that a per
stirpes distribution is to be preferred. Thus, in answers to the
questions posed above, the two children should take all the estate
in the first supposed case, and in the second case the two surviving
children should take one-third of the estate each and the six
children of the deceased child should take the other third to be
divided equally between them.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has favored a
per stirpes distribution in a case where a testatrix directed that
her stock and real estate be sold and divided equally. The
majority of the court decided that she meant that the proceeds
should be divided equally among her distributees. The court
stated:
Who are her distributees? The statute points them out. A
testamentary direction for division of money among distributees
involves a proposition closely analogous to a devise of land
to heirs or to descendants.
7 4 PAGE, W.Ls § 36.15 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961).
[Vol. 69
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In all cases which have come to our attention in this
connection, whether there be involved realty or personality, or
both, the courts have favored a per stirpes basis of divi-
sion .... '
The fact that the testatrix provided that the proceeds were
to be divided equally did not mean that there should be a per
capita distribution according to the court. In disposing of that
point the court stated:
Having regard to the different degrees of relationship of
those benefiting from her bounty, the language "divide equally"
cannot reasonably be taken to mean that grandnieces should
share equally with a sister-such would be the result per capita.
Circumstances considered, the direction for equal division
should be construed to require a distribution in conformity
with the law of intestacy, that is to say, equally in accordance
to stocks; and not an unnatural distribution "by the head."
Where beneficiaries are of different degrees of relationship,
a bequest to them, at large, should not be interpreted to mean
that each shall share equally with every other one, unless the
wording of the will clearly indicates such intention on the part
of the maker of the instrument.9
The West Virginia court apparently takes the view that the
West Virginia Legislature has made a will for everyone through the
intestacy laws, and that the Legislature has further provided that
a person can change this will by following certain procedures and
making one of his own; however, the individual's will changes the
Legislature's will only to the extent the individual makes it clear
he wants the latter changed.
In another case the court stated:
The statute of distribution governs in all cases where there is
no will; and where there is one, and the testators intention is
in doubt, the statute is a safe guide."°
8 Jones v. Hudson, 122 W. Va. 711, 714, 12 S.E.2d 533, 534 (1940).
9 Id. at 713-14, 12 S.E.2d at 534.
0Lieyv. Griffith, 84 W. Va. 393, 399, 99 S.E. 512, 514 (1919). See
also Collins v. Feather, 52 W. Va. 107, 43 S.E. 323 (1902), where the court
admitted that the weight of authority is to the effect that beneficiaries in a
will take per stirpes unless the langage in the will is such as to indicate that
the testator intended a per capita distribution. But the court refused to apply
that rule where the gift was to four named children and the grandchildren of a
deceased child, the children of another deceased child being otherwise pro-
vided for in the will.
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The West Virginia court has also looked to the statutes of descent
and distribution in other cases to help it in the construction of
wills.1 I
II. DiE WiTHoUT Issun
Testator devised Blackacre to his son, John, but if John should
die without issue, Blackacre was to go to the testator's surviving
grandchildren. Two problems are involved. The first, and the
one to be treated here, is the meaning of the phrase "die without
issue." The second, to be dealt with later in this aticle, the meaning
of "surviving grandchildren". Both these phrases appear innocent
and clear at first glance, but both have caused the courts consider-
able trouble.
The word "issue" has a clear meaning. It means lineal descen-
dants, and in geneology it connotes a common bloodstream. 2
But does "die without issue" mean die without leaving descendants
or die without having had descendants? In other words, does one
"die without issue" if he has had children, all of whom predecease
him without leaving descendants? The answer appears to be that
he does "die without issue" in such case.
The mere birth of issue to a person in such case should not be,
and generally is not, regarded as eliminating the possibility that
such person may die without issue. 3 When used in a will the
term "die without issue" is considered equivalent to the technical
expression "heirs of the body". The courts, in searching for the
testator's intention, have usually thought he intended that in case
the first taker had no issue to whom the property could descend
the property was to go to a substitute taker.
West Virginia Code § 36-1-13 (Michie 1966), quoted below,
appears to make it clear that in West Virginia one must die not
having issue living at the time of his death, or in gestation and
born alive thereafter, in order to die without issue. Then, it would
appear to follow logically that if John, the devisee in the above
It See, e.g., Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 128 W. Va.
703, 37 S.E.2d 563 (1946).
12 Fletcher v. Flanary, 185 Va. 409, 38 S.E.2d 433 (1946).
13 5 AmEiUcAr LAW OF PropEIaoy § 21.55 (Casner ed. 1952).
[Vol. 69
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hypothetical problem, should ever die without leaving any descen-
dants surviving him, the gift over to the grandchildren would
become effective. However, this is not the situation in many
jurisdictions, perhaps the majority thereof.
When must John die without issue for the gift over to take effect?
It has been held that there are four different times when a
person may die without issue so that a devise or bequest in a will
which is to take effect if the first taker should die without issue
will actually take effect, and each of these holdings have, or have
had, a substantial following. Such a devise or bequest may take
effect if the first taker should die without surviving issue:
1. Prior to the death of the testator, but not thereafter.
2. In case there is an intervening life estate-as where the estate
devised or bequeathed subject to the condition is a remainder-
prior to the termination of the life estate, but not thereafter.
3. At the death of the first taker.
A fourth time that such a gift could take effect is at the time
the line of the first taker should run out. This time will be dis-
cussed first in this article.
Die without issue can, and originally did, mean that one would
die without issue if his line ever ran out. The phrase was considered
as creating a fee tail to the same extent as if the testator had used
the term "heirs of the body." Thus, one could die without issue if
in some succeeding generation all his descendants died without
leaving descendants. This is known as the indefinite failure of
issue construction, and was the common law rule. Most states
have changed this construction by statute by this time. West
Virginia Code § 36-1-13 (Michie 1966) provides as follows:
Every limitation in any conveyance or will disposing of real
or personal property, contingent upon the dying of any person
without heirs, or heirs of the body, or issue of the body, or
children, or offspring, or descendant, or other relative, shall be
construed as a limitation, to take effect when such person shall
die, not having such heir, or issue, or child, or offspring, or
7
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descendant, or other relative, as the case may be, living at the
time of his death, or en ventre sa mere at the time of his
death and born alive thereafter, unless the intention of such
limitation be otherwise plainly declared on the face of the
conveyance or will creating it.
A similar statute in Virginia has been construed by the Supreme
Court of Virginia to change the indefinite failure of issue con-
struction to a definite failure of issue construction so that the
phrase "die without issue" means that you look to the time of the
death of the first taker to ascertain whether he died without
issue.14
But in many jurisdictions following the definite failure of issue
construction, our John could die without leaving surviving issue
and the limitation over to the substitute takers would not take
effect. That is because those jurisdictions construe the phrase
"die without issue", when used in a will, to mean "die without
issue before the testator dies." There are two very good reasons
for such a construction. The first such reason is that this is probably
what the testator had in mind, and the court is always attempting
to ascertain the intent of the testator in such case. Since the testator
probably realized that the will might not take effect for many years
after it was executed, and he probably further realized that many
things could occur in the interim, he could very well have meant
that if John should not survive him and should leave no descendants
who survive him, he wanted Blackacre to go to his grandchildren.
Under many anti-lapse statutes,s should John die before the
testator, leaving descendants who survived the testator, those
descendants would take Blackacre. The testator may well have
wanted John, who was apparently the first object of his bounty,
to have Blackacre in fee if John should survive him and want
John's issue to take Blackacre if John did not survive him and
some such issue did survive him, and want the gift over to take
effect only if John should not survive him and none of John's issue
should survive him. He may well have been thinking of the time
when the property would pass to John, the point of distribution,
when he used the term "die without issue."
14 Daniel v. Lipscomb, 110 Va. 563, 66 S.E. 850 (1910).
's See, e.g., W. Va. CODE§ 41-3-3 (Michie 1966).
[Vol. 69
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The second reason that many courts favor the construction that
the testator intended the phrase "die without issue" to mean "die
without issue before the testator dies" is because courts favor an
early vesting of estates. This would mean that upon surviving the
testator, John would take an estate in fee simple rather than a fee
simple subject to divestment by a condition subsequent-his dying
without issue at some future time. He would have an estate which
would be freely alienable in the sense that there would be a market
for it. If it were an estate subject to a condition subsequent there
would be few purchasers willing to take the chance of John's sub-
sequent death without issue unless they could buy the property for
a price considerably less than its true and actual value. Of course,
John would have a vested estate under this construction should
he survive the testator, but the estate would be subject to divest-
ment, an estate far less alienable in a practical sense than a vested
estate in fee simple. A purchaser, in order to obtain the fee simple
absolute, would have to purchase the shifting executory interest
owned by the grandchildren as well as the fee simple subject to
a condition subsequent owned by John. This may be difficult to
do as all such grandchildren may not yet be born. 6 Furthermore,
John may die without issue and there be no surviving grand-
children, in which case the reversion which was left in the testator's
estate would no longer be subject to divestment and would become
the fee simple.
A lawyer practicing in the northern panhandle of West Virginia
must be very careful when advising clients in cases of this type.
Since Pennsylvania and Ohio are so close by, he must be especially
careful to ascertain where the client lives in the case of personal
property or where the land is located in the case of real property.
If Pennsylvania law is applicable to his client's case, and the
first taker has survived the testator, the first taker has the entire
interest in the property. The Pennsylvania court has long followed
the rule that, where a gift is made in a will to a person followed
by a provision that in case of the death of the person without
issue another is to take the property, it shall be construed to mean
death without issue before the testator dies. 7
16 See W. Va. CODE § 36-2-1 to -13 (Michie 1966), which provides for the
sale of such an interest through a court proceeding.1 7 In re Haydon's Estate, 334 Pa. 403, 6 A.2d 581 (1939); Mickley's
Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 514 (1880).
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If Ohio law is applicable the opposite result would prevail. The
Ohio court follows the view that where a gift in a will to a person
is coupled with a provision that if the person die without issue the
property is to go to another, the words "die without issue" are
interpreted as referring to the time of the death of the first taker
unless a contrary intent is clearly manifested.'8
If West Virginia law is applicable, the lawyer will have no case
in point on which to rely. However, the West Virginia court has
followed the "death without issue at anytime" view of the Ohio
court without having considered the issue. 9 The point was raised
in one case,2" and may have been decided. But the court after
raising the point, slipped to another point very quickly without
coming to grips with it. At any rate, the court went along with
the view that the limitation over took effect if the first taker died
without issue at any time. In another case where the point was
raised by counsel the Court stated:
The language employed in the framing of this contingency
cannot be construed, as contended for by the plaintiff, as
referring to the death of Paul Brookover only in event he should
die before the testator died. If this item stood alone, the
contention thus urged would possibly be better grounded,
but, it must be read and considered in conjunction with all the
other provisions of the will. The general context of the will
indicates, we think, beyond doubt, the testator was under-
taking to stipulate definitely as to the devolution of the property
devised and bequeathed to Paul Brookover, in event Paul,
subsequent to the death of the testator, should die without
issue ... "
If the testator has provided for a life estate before the gift to
the first taker of the fee, there is still another point of time to
which he may have had reference. If the gift in the will was to
testators wife, Mary, for her life, with the remainder to go to
John, but if John should die without issue the property was to go
to testator's grandchildren, the testator may have meant it was
"
8Cook v. Crabill, 110 Ohio App. 45, 164 N.E.2d 425 (1959); Stein-
brenner v. Dreher, 140 Ohio St. 305, 43 N.E.2d 283 (1942).19 See, e.g., Wilson v. Drake, 135 W. Va. 502, 64 S. E. 2d 601 (1951);
Stephenson v. Kuntz, 131 W. Va. 599, 49 S.E.2d 235 (1948).
2o Dent v. Pickens, 61 W. Va. 488, 58 S.E. 1029 (1907).
21 Brookover v. Grimm, 118 W. Va. 227, 238, 190 S.E. 697, 703 (1937).
[Vol. 69
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to go to the grandchildren if John should die without issue before
the life tenant died. Again it is plausible to believe that he was
thinking of the time the possession of the property was to pass to
John, the point of distribution.
Some of the courts which have followed the theory that the phrase
"die without issue" refers to the time of the death of the first taker
whenever it occurs in the case of an immediate gift-one where
the taker is entitled to possession at the death of the testator or
when testator's personal property is distributed-have shifted to
the view that, in the case of a mediate gift-one following a life
estate-the phrase refers to the time of the death of the life tenant.22
If this view were followed, then in the last illustration given
John would take a fee simple absolute if he survived Mary, the
life tenant, and the estate would not be divested if he should later
die without issue.
In both the Wilson and Stephenson cases, cited above,23 the West
Virginia court was faced with gifts by will to one person for life
with the remainder to another with a limitation over to a third
person if the remainderman should die without issue. Without
discussing the matter in either case the court held that the remainder
which, on the death of the life tenant, had become the fee was
defeated upon the death of the remainderman without issue sub-
sequent to the death of the life tenant. It may be that West Virginia
Code § 36-1-13 (Michie 1966), quoted above, makes this con-
struction mandatory.
It should also be noted that there is ground for holding that the
death of the life tenant is the time referred to when the phrase
"die without issue" is used in a deed involving a life estate as well
as in a will. In the case of a deed conveying an estate entitling
the grantee to immediate possession, the only time to which the
grantor could be referring in using such a phrase is the death of
the grantee, the first taker.
It should be noted that if the term "die without issue" is held to
mean die without issue before the testator dies, or before the life
tenant dies in case there is an intervening life estate, and the first
taker survives the testator, or the life tenant where there is a life
225 A.mucA LAw o' PaomemTY § 21.53 (Casner ed. 1952).
2
-
3 Wilson v. Drake, 135 W. Va. 502, 64 S.E.2d 601 (1951); Stephenson
v. Kuntz. 131 W. Va. 599, 49 S.E.2d 235 (1948).
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estate, the limitation over fails. The fee becomes indefeasibly
vested in the first taker in such cases.
In the hypothetical case posed at the beginning of this section
of this paper there was a gift over to surviving grandchildren. It
was suggested at that point that there was a problem involved as
to the meaning of the term "surviving grandchildren." The next
section of this paper will deal with that problem.
III. CoNmrrioN oF SuRvrvoismIp
Where there is an immediate gift in a will to a group of persons
such as the testator's surviving grandchildren, almost all courts
hold that the term means the grandchildren surviving the testator."
All grandchildren alive at the testator's death take an immediate
indefeasibly vested interest. But when the gift to surviving persons
follows a life estate, or some other preceding interest, there is a split
of authority. The majority of the courts look to the point of dis-
tribution in such case, as do most courts in the case of an im-
mediate gift.2" In the majority of jurisdictions where there is a
gift to Mary for life with the remainder to testators surviving
grandchildren, those grandchildren alive at Mary's death would
take indefeasibly vested interests. But there is authority to the
effect that even here "surviving" will be construed as referring to
those surviving the testator's death.2"
The Supreme Court of West Virginia has taken a fairly firm
stand on this issue in several cases."7
In the Neal case28 the court stated:
The old rule referring survivorship to the death of the
testator, though another period be intended, is not the rule in
this state. The more modem rule obtains here, that survivor-
ship will be referred to the event plainly intended by the
24 2 TFrANY, REAL PnoPRTY § 380 (3d ed. 1939).
25 Snvms & Smrrq, FurunE ImEBE § 577 (2d ed. 1956).
262 TIFFANY, 1 i. PROPERTY § 380 (3d ed. 1939).
27 See Wilson v. Drake, 135 W.Va. 502, 64 S.E.2d 601 (1951); Prichard
v. Prichard, 83 W. Va. 652, 98 S.E. 877 (1919); Neal v. Hamilton Co., 70
W. Va. 250, 73 S.E. 971 (1912); Dent v. Pickens, 61 W. Va. 488, 58 S.E.
1029 (1907).
28 Neal v. Hamilton, supra note 27.
[Vol. 69
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testator, whether that event be before, at the time of, or after
the death of the testator.29
Syllabus point 3 to the Pfichard case3" reads as follows:
Where, under the provisions of a will or trust instrument, a
gift to a class, here described as "surviving grandchildren,"
is postponed to a particular time, or pending the termination
of a preceding estate, generally survivorship is to be referred
to the time when the property or fund is divisible, and those
members of the class then living will take the whole, unless the
particular language used confines the gift to those in existence
at the date of the instrument or at the death of the testator or
donor.3
Referring back to the hypothetical problem posed at the begin-
ning of the preceding section of this paper, where Blackacre was
devised to John but if he should die without issue to the testators
surviving grandchildren, an attempt will now be made to construe
the gift.
Assuming that John survived the testator, he would have an
indefeasibly vested estate in, Blackacre in those jurisdictions con-
struing "die without issue" to mean die without issue before the
testator dies. The limitation over to the grandchildren would fail
in such case. In jurisdictions construing the phrase to mean die
without issue at any time, upon surviving the testator, John would
take a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. If he should
later die leaving surviving issue, the fee would become indefeasibly
vested in the persons then owning it, claiming through John. If
John should later die without leaving surviving issue, testator's
grandchildren surviving John's death would take.32
Gifts are sometimes made in wills to the survivor of several
persons or a class of persons, and the courts have had to determine
the meaning of the word "survivor" when so used.
In one case where there was a gift of a remainder to a named
group of persons and "the survivors or survivor of them" the court
29 Id. at 260, 73 S.E. at 975.30Prichard v. Prichard, 83 W. Va. 652, 98 S.E. 877 (1919).
31 Ibid.
32 See Dent v. Pickens, 61 W. Va. 488, 58 S.E. 1029 (1907), where the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia so held. See also 2 Trrrxr,
RrA PaoPariY § 380 (3d ed. 1939).
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held that the members of the group took estates which were subject
to defeasance upon their death leaving surviving members, and the
last survivor took an estate in fee simple.3
But that case is not in accord with the general rule. In such
case, again, most of the courts will look to the time of distribution.
Thus, if the gift is to take effect at the testator's death-an im-
mediate gift-the word "survivors" will prima facie be construed
as referring to the time of the testator's death, and the members
of the group who are alive at that time take indefeasible interests. 4
Where the gift is not an immediate gift, but a mediate one,
there being a life estate or some other particular interest carved
out, there is a split of authority as to whether the members of the
group take indefeasibly vested interests if they survive the testator
or if they survive the termination of the preceding estate. But the
prevailing rule is that they must survive the termination of the
preceding interest to take such interests. 5
In a West Virginia case where the gift was a remainder to two
nieces and to "the survivor or survivors of them," the Supreme Court
of Appeals held that both nieces had satisfied the condition of sur-
vivorship when they survived the life tenant. 6 The court stated
that if either of them had predeceased the life tenant, the survivor
would have taken the entire estate.
Since there were only two remaindermen in the West Virginia
case and the testator used the words "the survivor or survivors of
them", he must have had in mind the survivor or survivors at his
death or at the death of the life tenant, and not a gift to the ultimate
survivor. If the gift had been to the remaindermen "and the survivor
of them", a closer question on that point would have been pre-
sented. Since this was one of the cases in which the court, without
discussing the point, determined the phrase "die without issue"
meant die without issue at the death of the first takers, the court
may have held that the survivor of the two should take the entire
property if the gift had been to them or the survivor of them. The
33 Nelson v. Iglehart, 205 Md. 129, 106 A.2d 115 (1954).
34 2 TiFFANY, REAL P.RoPERTY § 380 (3d ed. 1939).
35 Sm s & SMrm, FutruRE I nTmEEsU § 577 (2d ed. 1956).
36 Wilson v. Drake, 135 W. Va. 502, 64 S.E.2d 601 (1951).
[Vol. 69
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issue as to the time to which survivorship referred was raised by
counsel in the case, but apparently the issue as to the time to
which "die without issue" referred was not raised. The determina-
tion of both of these issues should depend upon the testator's
intent." The court in the West Virginia case so stated so far as
the issue of survivorship was concerned.3 8 In another case the
court stated:
It was a general rule that in the construction of wills, words
of survivorship should be deemed to refer to the death of the
testator. This principle, deemed too narrow and restrictive,
has yielded in later years to more flexible interpretation of such
testamentary provisions. Under the modern rule, "survivorship
will be referred to the event plainly intended by the testator,
whether that event be before, at the time of, or after the death
of the testator."3 9
IV. GIFrs To D.EsNm.xArs PER S=mEs
Perhaps one of the most common situations a lawyer has to face
when drafting a will is to provide that if the testator's spouse does
not survive him the testator devises and bequeaths the residue of
his estate to his children, but if any child should predecease the
testator, leaving descendants who do survive the testator, such
descendants shall take the share such child would have taken had
he survived the testator, per stirpes.
Many lawyers have attempted to express the same idea by pro-
viding that in such case the testator devises and bequeaths the
residue of his estate to his descendants living at the time of his
death, per stirpes. The meaning of this clause is not completely
clear even though it has been used again and again by lawyers.
If at the time of the testator's death he has two children surviving
him as well as one or more grandchildren who are the children
of a deceased child of the testator, all lawyers would probably
agree that the residue would be divided into three shares, one
going to each of the two surviving children and the third going to
the children of the deceased child to be divided equally between
them.
3 7 Brookover v. Crimm, 118 W. Va. 227, 190 S.E. 697 (1937).30 Wilson v. Drake, 125 W. Va. 502, 508, 64 S.E.2d 601, 605 (1951).
39Brookover v. Grimm, 118 W. Va. 227, 238-39, 190 S.E. 697, 704(1937).
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But there is disagreement among lawyers with whom the writer
has talked concerning the result when such a clause is used and
the following situations occur:
(a) At the testator's death all of his children are dead and the
then living descendants of the testator consist of one grandchild,
the child of a deceased child of the testator; two grandchildren,
the children of another deceased child of the testator; and three
grandchildren, the children of third deceased child of the testator.
(b) At the testators death all of his children are dead and the
then living descendant's of the testator consist of one grandchild,
the child of a deceased child of the testator; two grandchildren,
the children of another deceased child of the testator; and two
great-grandchildren, the then only living descendants of an only
child of a third deceased child of the testator.
Some lawyers say that in situation (a) the estate would still be
divided into three shares, and a share given to the child or children
of each of the deceased children of the testator. One grandchild
would get a third, two grandchildren would share another third,
and the remaining third would be divided between the three
children of the third deceased child of the testator. Thus, one
grandchild would take twice as much as some of the grandchildren
and three times as much as other grandchildren.
Those same lawyers say that in situation (b) the estate would
also be divided into three shares, one share to go to the one grand-
child lucky enough not to have any brothers or sisters surviving
the testator, one share going to the other two grandchildren, and
the third share going to the two great-grandchildren.
While there is some support for such views, it is submitted that
the better and majority view is to the contrary in each instance. In
situation (a) the residue should be divided equally-per capita-
between the grandchildren, each taking a one-sixth share. In
situation (b) the residue should be divided into four shares, one
share going to each of the surviving grandchildren and the remain-
ing share going to the great-grandchildren. Thus, the grandchildren
would each take one-fourth and the great-grandchildren would
each take one-eighth.
While there is no clear West Virginia authority on these issues,
[Vol. 69
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what authority there is appears to support the latter views. The
West Virginia Code § 42-1-3 (Michie 1966) provides as follows:
Whenever the children of the intestate, or the brothers and
sisters of the intestate, or the uncles and aunts of the intestate,
or the brothers and sisters of any of the intestate's lineal
ancestors of the same degree, come into partition, they shall
take per capita, or by persons; and where, a part of them being
dead and a part living, the descendants of those dead have
right to partition, such descendants shall take per stirpes, or
by stocks, that is to say, the shares of their deceased ancestors;
but whenever the persons entitled to partition, other than those
whose shares are definitely fixed by the statute of descents,
are all in the same degree of kindred to the intestate, they shall
take per capita or by persons.
At a time when this state was a part of Virginia a case involving the
predecessor of this statute was before the Virginia court.40 The
statute at that time did not include language similar to that of
the last clause of the existing West Virginia statute, and the court
decided that it did not expressly control in regard to the fact situa-
tion before it. The court decided the case in accordance with the
common law, but looked to the statute for some guidance.
In that case the intestate had a brother and a sister who pre-
deceased him. The brother had one child, and that child survived
the intestate. The sister had four children, two of whom survived
the intestate and two of whom predeceased him. One of those who
predeceased the intestate had two children who survived him and
the other had six who survived. Thus, there were three nieces and
nephews and eight great-nieces and great-nephews who survived
the intestate. It was argued that the niece who was the sole child
of intestate's brother should take one-half the estate and the other
half should be divided between the descendants of the sister. The
court held that the estate should be divided into five equal parts,
of which each niece and nephew who survived the intestate should
each take one part; one part should go to the two children of the
deceased niece; and the other parts to the six children of the
other deceased niece. Judge Car ,who wrote the majority opinion,
stated:
40 See Davis v. Rowe, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 355 (1828).
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I would divide the inheritance into as many parts, as there
were members of the grade nearest the intestate, of which
any survive, taking the survivors, and those who have died
leaving issue."1
In speaking of the Virginia case,42 one authority states:
It is a just inference from this decision, that if a grandfather
dies intestate, having had two children, A. and B., both of
whom died before their father, but A. leaves one child, and
B. six children, the estate of the grandfather will descend
to all the grandchildren equally, and the child of A. will only
get a seventh part, although if A. had been alive, and the
other brother dead, A. would have received a moiety and the
other moiety would have been divided between the six children
of B., and so of all other case of like kind. 3
In Overton v. Heckathorn," a case involving the intestate dis-
tribution of property, the West Virginia court, in speaking of the
above quoted statute, stated in the syllabus that the statute did
not go beyond classes of persons having living representatives. The
court further stated in the syllabus that the statute takes "the nearest
class having one or more living representatives, and, if some of
that class are dead, their descendants take the shares their ancestors
would have received, had they survived the intestate." The statute
at the time the case was decided was not different in principle
from the existing statute.
The court in the Overton case followed the Virginia case. The
court was construing the above quoted statute and in speaking
of the decree of the lower court, which it affirmed, the court stated:
The decree construes and applies the statute, in exact accord
with the construction an earlier one received at the hands of
the court in Davi v. Rowe, 6 Rand. 355, the decision in which
would be as authoritative here, as if it had been rendered by
this court, under the same statute and upon a like state of
facts. When it was rendered, the Code of 1819 governed, and
the law of descents and distributions was verbally altered in
41 Id. at 376.
42 Davis v. Rowe, supra note 40.
436 M.J. Descent and Distribution § 23 (1949).
- 81 W. Va. 640, 95 S.E. 82 (1918).
(Vol. 69
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1849, by the insertion of a clause in sec. 3 of ch. 123 of the
Code of 1849, at the instance of the Virginia Revisers, which
they said, in recommending its adoption, was intended for
express adoption of the interpretation put upon the previous
statute by a majority of the court, in Davis v. Rowe. That
clause says: 'But whenever those entitled to partition are all
in the same degree of kindred to the intestate, they shall take
per capita or by persons." As so amended, the statute has
been retained and continued in this state. 5
While the quoted statute was designed to govern the descent and
distribution of intestate property, it has considerable effect in the
case of testate distribution of property because, in the absence
of an expressed intent to the contrary, the courts often construe
a will by which property is to be divided among a specified class
as contemplating a division in conformity to the statutes of descent
and distribution of their jurisdictions.46 In Giles v. Von Cain,4"
a case involving the distribution of property under a will, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia stated:
All of the authorities hold that the rule of the statute of
descents and distribution is to be followed unless a different
intention is made to appear, but the same authorities hold that
this rule will readily yield to the force of extrinsic circumstances
casting light upon the testator's intent and expressed in the
context tending to show an intention inconsistent with it.
48
In the West Virginia case, where the residue of the testator's
estate was devised and bequeathed to the heirs of his three deceased
sons, to be divided equally between such heirs, the court held that
such heirs were to take equally even though one son had one heir,
a second had one heir and a third had three heirs. The court in
that case stated:
In the case here the beneficiaries under the will, namely the
heirs of the deceased sons named, all stood in the same degree
of relationship to the testator. It can not be assumed that he
45 Id. at 642, 95 S.E. at 83.
464 PAGE, Wr.s § 36.8 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961).
4793 W. Va. 632, 117 S.E. 488 (1923).481 Id. at 635, 117 S.E. at 489. See also Jones v. Hudson, 122 W. Va. 711,
12 S.E.2d 533 (1940); Collins v. Feather, 52 W. Va. 107, 43 S.E. 323 (1903).
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preferred any one of them above another. If he had left no
will, his estate, by the very terms of our statute, section 3,
chapter 78 of the Code, would have gone to these three sets of
grandchildren per capita and not per stirpes. The last clause
of that section says: "Whenever those entitled to partition are
all in the same degree of kindred to the intestate, they shall take
per capita or by persons."
There is nothing in the context of the will, nor is there any-
thing alleged in the bill, except as to the phonograph and
records disposed of to Lavis Combs, to evince that the testator
intended to discriminate between his grandchildren; quite the
contrary, for his direction was that his estate, except the phono-
graph, was to be divided equally between them. His will,
which is the law of the case, is in consonance with the statute,
which is founded on justice and equity."9
In an early West Virginia case involving a will, the court, by
dictum, appeared to state that beneficiaries under a will, being of
the same class, would take equally even though they may receive
more or less than the share that their ancestors would have taken
had they survived to the point of distribution. In that case the
will gave the residue of testator's property to William McCoy, 3d,
but if he should die without lawful issue, to the testator's brothers
and sisters then living and the heirs of those who were dead as
the law of Virginia directed. The testator died in 1835, and William
McCoy, 3d, died in 1861 without lawful issue. It was alleged, but
not proved, that all the testator's brothers and sisters, ten in num-
ber, were dead in 1861, and it was alleged, but not proved, that
all twenty of their children were alive at that time. One of these
children, a niece of testator and the sole child of one of his sisters,
contended that she was to receive one-tenth of the estate, based
upon a per stirpes distribution. The court did not decide how the
estate was to go since it did not have sufficient proven facts before
it to do so, but the court did state:
If therefore the law be correctly stated in the answer, it
may still be true, that the only heirs at law of Genl William
49 Giles v. Von Cain, 93 W. Va. 632, 635, 117 S.E. 488, 489 (1932).50 McCoy v. McCoy, 29 W. Va. 794 (1887).
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McCoy at the death of Wiliam McCoy 3d were his nephews
and nieces, who all stood in the same relation to him, and the
distribution according to the law of Virginia would be per
capita not per stirpes, and the interest of Lucinda Rexroade
was not the share of her mother, Sarah McCoy, one of the
brothers and sisters of Gen'1 McCoy ....
When the early Virginia case was decided the Virginia statute
did not, as does the West Virginia law, specially provide for the
cases where all the individuals of any of the classes named were
dead, leaving issue.2 But, as has been shown, it was decided in
Virginia that in such case the distribution should be per capita if the
issue is the same degree of relationship to the intestate.53
In another Virginia case the court stated:
It is also true that in the ordinary course of descent a living
sister is preferred to the sons and daughters of dead brothers,
and to give effect to this the division in a proper case is per
stirpes and not per capita. . ....
An authority on the law of wills states:
If the devisees or legatees stand in unequal degrees of re-
lationship to the testator the law favors a construction which
results in a distribution per stirpes among the beneficiaries."
If a gift is to "heirs" and they stand in an equal degree of
relationship to their ancestor, it is said that a per capita
division is required. 6
Relatives of equal degree included in the same gift usually take
per capita although of different stocks, but those of different degree
included in the same gift usually take per stirpes, all in absence of
a contrary intent expressed or implied in the will."
Where a per stirpes distribution is to be made it is necessary to
51 id, at 816.
52 See 6 M.J. Descent and Distribution § 23 (1949). The early Virginia
case referred to is Davis v. Rowe, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 355 (1828).
53 Davis v. Rowe, supra note 52.54 Murchinson v. Wallace 156 Va. 728, 737, 159 S.E. 106, 110 (1931).
554 PAE , Wnr.s § 36.8 (Bowe-Parker ed. 1961).56 1d at § 36.14.
57 96 C.J.S. Wills § 712 (1957).
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determine who are the heads of the respective stirpes, and there is
often a question as to whom or what class is to be taken as the
stirpes or root. Where the division is to be per stirpes, it has been
held that the stirpes or root begins with, or the persons who are the
root are, those who, by the terms of the will, are the first possible
takers of the testamentary gift.58
In most cases it is easy to infer from the terms of the limitation
who are to be taken as the stirpes or root. But in cases where no
such inference can be drawn from the terms of the limitation, as in
the case of "my descendants," the heads of the respective stirpes are
the possible takers who are the oldest generation in which there
is at least one member living at the time distribution is to be made.5"
The Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the
American Law Institute and the American Bar Association has
considered this problem to some extent. In one of its publications
it prescribes the form of a trust which sets up a life estate, with
the principal payable upon the death of the life tenant "to the
Grantor's then living descendants, in equal shares per stirpes."
In its comments on the forms it states:
The words "in equal shares per stirpe" are sufficient to cover
the usual intention that there shall be equal shares for each per-
son of the same generation and an equal share for the chil-
dren of a deceased person in that generation."1
The Supreme Court of Ohio had before it a case substantially in
point when it decided Kraemer v. Hook.2 In that case the testator
provided at the termination of a trust setting up certain life
estates the trust estate was to be distributed per stirpes among his
heirs at law determined as if the testator's death had occurred at
the time the trust was terminated. At the time provided for the
distribution of the trust estate, the generation with living members
closest in relationship to the testator was one composed of his
58 Id. at § 707.
59 Patchell v. Groom, 185 Md. 10 43 A.2d 32 (1945); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 301, comment h (1940); id. § 303, comment f.60 TWEm & PARSONS, Lnm AND TESTAMENTARY ESTATE PLANNING
(rev. ed. 1959).
61 Id. at 156-57.
62 168 Ohio St. 221, 152 N.E.2d 430 (1958).
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nieces and nephews. There were eleven living nieces and nephews
and seven deceased nieces and nephews who had descendants
living. The court held that the trust estate should be divided into
eighteen equal shares, each living niece and nephew to get a 1/18th
interest and a 1/18th interest to go to the descendants of each
deceased niece and nephew. In its opinion the court stated the
following rule of law:
[W]here, as in the instant case, by using the general phrase,
"heirs at law," the roots or stirpes of a per stirpes devise or
bequest are not specifically designated, such roots or stirpes
will be found to be in the nearest generation of heirs at law
of the decendent, having living members at the time heirship
is determined, according to the applicable statutes of descent
and distribution, and that generation shall comprise the "root
generation."63
While the law in regard to the issue is far from clear, it is a fair
inference from the authorities cited and quoted herein that the
limitation "to my descendants living at the time of my death, per
stirpes" when used in a will means that the descendants in the
generation having living members nearest in relationship to the
testator at his death shall take equal shares, and if some members
of that generation are deceased, leaving descendants who survive
the testator, those descendants are to take the share their ancestors
would have taken, bad they survived the testator.
V. CONCLUSION
It appears that it is reasonable to conclude that there are situa-
tions, arising from the language testators often use in wills where
the courts are attempting to find the intentions of the testators
where there were in fact no intentions at all. A testator, having
executed his will many years before his death and when the
situation was entirely different from the situation existing at his
death, had no intent concerning the latter situation because he had
an entirely different situation in mind when he executed his will.
Had the testator actually had in mind the situation which existed at
his death when he executed his will, he very probably would have
631d. at 233, 152 N.E.2d at 439.
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expressed his intention differently than the way it was expressed
in his will.
The court, in such situation, may say that the intent of the
testator is the polar star which it will use as a guide in the
interpretation of the words used by the testator, and then find
an intent which never existed in the testator's mind.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in expressing itself on this subject,
stated:
In extreme cases, in England, as well as in certain jurisdic-
tions in America, the courts, under the guise of doing what the
court imagines the testator would have done had he foreseen
the situation, have gone a long way toward the substitution
of the will of the court for that of the testator....64
In such a situation, the court is in a dilemma; should it let a devise
or bequest in a will fail because it is too indefinite, or should it
attempt to determine what the testator would have intended had he
actually foreseen the situation that existed at his death? If a person
fails to execute a will and dies intestate, the legislature or other law
making body of the state having jurisdiction over his property has
determined by its laws governing the descent and distribution of
property where and to whom that person's property shall go. In
effect, the law-making body has made wills for those who fail to
make their own. But, a person has the right to change the will
so made for him by making his own will. If he has done so, the court
should do what it can to make that will, and not the will of the law-
making body, dispose of the testator's property.
The court, while making a decision as to a particular will in
such a case, is in reality establishing a rule of construction which
will be applicable to similar situations in the future. A rule of
construction, unlike a rule of law, is not applicable where a
contrary intent is manifested, and should not be used by a court to
supplant such intent. Such a rule should operate as a presumption
which is rebutted when there is evidence that the testator actually
intended otherwise.
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Where the intent of a testator is not clear as applied to a particular
fact situation, a rule of construction can be a lawyer's best friend.
If the rule is available for his use, so that he knows with reasonable
certainty how the court will interpret a particular phrase as applied
to the particular situation, he can advise his client without the
necessity of asking a court to construe the will under consideration.
Thus, if the lawyer represents a client who is interested in pur-
chasing real estate the title to which is derived by the present owner
from a will devising it to him, the will providing that if he should
die without issue the real estate is to go to another, the lawyer
should be able to properly advise his client. If the jurisdiction in
which the real estate is situate has established as a rule of construc-
tion that such a phrase means that the title is to shift from the first
to the other person only if the first taker should die without issue
before the testator dies, and the first taker, [present owner] has sur-
vived the testator, the lawyer can advise his client that the present
owner has the fee simple title. On the other hand, if the law of the
jurisdiction involved has established the rule of construction that the
phrase means the land is to go to the other person if the first taker
should, at his death, leave no surviving descendants, the lawyer
can advise his client that the present owner has only a fee simple
subject to a condition subsequent. The client could be advised that
in purchasing the real estate he would be taking a calculated risk,
depending upon the likelihood of the present owner later dying
without issue.65
In many of the situations considered in this article the courts have
had to determine the time to which particular language referred.
"Die without issue" when? "Survive" until what time? A gift to
John's surviving children means a gift to those children who survive
to what time?
It is submitted that a court in considering such situations should
look to the time the possession of the property involved is to go to
the recipient as a guide to the time to which reference is made-the
point of distribution. If the gift is of property that is to go to the
65 See Brown v. Brown, 89 W. Va. 339, 109 S.E. 815 (1921). where
the court held that the owners of the future interest following such a fee
were not entitled to an injunction against waste. The court reasoned that
since the first taker had nine children, most of whom were adults with
children of their own, the likelihood of the first taker dying without issue was
very remote.
25
Brown: The Testator's Intent--Vague Meanings of Clear Sounding Phrases
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1967
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
devisee or legatee at the death of the testator - and personal
property for this purpose is thought of as going to the legatee at
the death of the testator although actual distribution may be de-
layed - there are advantages to a construction which fixes the
testator's death as the time to which reference is made. If the gift
is not an immediate gift such as that described in the preceding
sentence, but a mediate one, there being a life estate or some other
particular interest preceding the time when the devisee or legatee
is entitled to possession of the property, there are advantages to a
construction which fixes the time the taker is entitled to possession
- the point of distribution in such case - as the time to which
reference is made.
While these rules of construction are fine aids for a lawyer to have
available, they are of no use to him unless he knows that there is a
problem involved when he is asked by his client for advice in regard
to the provisions of a will. Such rules are only solutions to problems,
not guides to be used in finding whether a problem exists. The
lawyer must be alert to the fact that innocent sounding language
may present a problem.
[Vol. 69
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